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OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Nita K. Patel and her husband, Kirtish N. Patel, were 
convicted of defrauding Medicare in a prior criminal 
proceeding.  The United States then brought this civil action 
for the same fraudulent schemes against Ms. Patel, Ms. 
Patel’s healthcare company (Heart Solution P.C.), Mr. Patel, 
and Mr. Patel’s healthcare company (Biosound Medical 
Services).  The United States prevailed in the District Court 
and only Ms. Patel and Heart Solution appealed.  
 
In granting summary judgment to the United States, 
the District Court relied on the Patels’ convictions and plea 
colloquies in the criminal case, essentially concluding that 
Ms. Patel had already admitted to all elements and issues 
relevant to her civil liability.  However, the District Court 
failed to dissect the issues that were determined in the 
criminal case from those that were not.  It lumped together 
Ms. Patel and Heart Solution, even though Heart Solution was 
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not involved in the criminal case.  It also failed to 
disaggregate claims Medicare paid to Ms. Patel and Heart 
Solution from those paid to Mr. Patel and Biosound.  As such, 
it erred in finding that Ms. Patel and Heart Solution conceded 
all of the essential elements to every claim in this appeal.  
Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in part 
and vacate in part and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
 
I.  
In November 2015, the Patels pled guilty to separate, 
but nearly identical, criminal information charges under 18 
U.S.C. § 1347 for defrauding Medicare.1  They conducted this 
fraud through two separate schemes.  First, the Patels 
submitted diagnostic reports to Medicare that should have 
been written by a specialist physician—but were not—and 
contained forged physician signatures.  Ms. Patel and Heart 
Solution do not dispute liability with respect to the claims 
involving this scheme.  The second scheme involved 
diagnostic neurological testing.  Medicare regulations require 
all diagnostic testing to be “reasonable and necessary,” as 
defined under Medicare Part B.2   In order for diagnostic 
neurological testing to be “reasonable and necessary,” it must 
be performed under the proper level of physician 
supervision.3   The Patels did not comply with these 
regulations.  Instead of employing a supervising neurologist 
for these tests, the Patels falsely represented to Medicare that 
                                              
1 Ms. Patel was sentenced to 78 months in prison and is 
currently serving her sentence. 
2 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A). 
3 42 C.F.R. § 410.32(b)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(k).  
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the neurological testing was being supervised by a licensed 
neurologist.   
 
Much of this appeal centers on Ms. Patel’s plea 
colloquy for her criminal conviction.  The relevant parts of 
the colloquy follow.  First, the sentencing judge asked Ms. 
Patel whether she and her husband “own and operate mobile 
diagnostic companies known as Biosound Medical Services 
and Heart Solution PC,” and she responded, “yes.”4  Neither 
the court, the government, nor Ms. Patel clarified whether she 
had ownership interests in both companies or just Heart 
Solution.5  Next, the judge asked whether between 2006 and 
2014, Ms. Patel and her husband “falsely represent[ed] to 
Medicare that the neurological testing being performed at 
Biosound Medical Services was being supervised by a 
licensed neurologist, when, in fact, it was not.”6  Again, she 
responded “yes.”7  Neither the court nor the parties addressed 
whether Heart Solution—as opposed to the Patels or 
Biosound—made any such misrepresentations.  Finally, the 
judge asked whether, “Biosound Medical Services and Heart 
Solution, PC, [were] paid at least [$1.18 million] by Medicare 
. . . for diagnostic neurological testing that was never 
supervised by a licensed neurologist.”  Ms. Patel answered, 
                                              
4 A41.  
5 Ms. Patel does not contest that she owns Heart Solution.  
The parties disagree on whether Ms. Patel had any ownership 
interest in Biosound.  But as discussed in III.A, whether Ms. 
Patel had an ownership interest in Biosound is irrelevant; 
thus, we do not make any determinations as to this issue.  
6 A43.  
7 A43.  
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“yes.”8  Neither the parties nor the court sought to clarify 
whether one company was paid the entire amount or whether 
the payments were divided between the companies.   
 
In June 2014, relator Jane Doe brought a qui tam suit 
under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Ms. Patel, Mr. 
Patel, Biosound, and Heart Solution.  The United States filed 
a complaint in intervention on November 18, 2015.  The 
plaintiffs sought to hold the Patels and the two companies 
civilly liable for defrauding Medicare through the two 
schemes described above.  Specifically, they claimed the 
defendants violated two provisions of the FCA by (1) 
“knowingly present[ing] or caus[ing] to be presented a false 
or fraudulent claim,”9 and (2) “knowingly mak[ing], us[ing], 
or caus[ing] to be made or used a false record or statement 
material to a false or fraudulent claim.”10  They also brought 
common law claims including fraud, unjust enrichment, 
disgorgement of profits, and payment by mistake of fact. 
 
In March 2016, the plaintiffs moved for partial 
summary judgment on the two FCA counts, arguing that Ms. 
Patel’s admissions during her plea colloquy established all the 
elements of the FCA claims and that therefore Heart Solution 
and Ms. Patel were collaterally estopped from contesting 
FCA liability.  In their opposition brief, the defendants relied 
on a statement submitted by Mr. Patel in a pleading entitled 
“Certification of Kirtish N. Patel.”  In it, Mr. Patel claimed 
                                              
8 A44.  Medicare paid a total of $1,668,954.95.  $1.18 million 
was for the neurological testing, and the remainder was for 
the scheme not at issue here.   
9 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). 
10 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). 
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that Biosound employed a supervising neurologist from 2006 
to 2007 and from 2012 to 2014.  The defendants argued that 
the statement raised an issue of fact as to the time frame 
during which Biosound lacked a supervising neurologist.  The 
statement was not sworn and was not made under the penalty 
of perjury.   
 
The District Court granted summary judgment to 
plaintiffs on July 8, 2016, finding that the guilty pleas and 
accompanying colloquies established all elements of the FCA 
claims and collaterally estopped the defendants from 
contesting liability.  It also struck the section of Mr. Patel’s 
statement regarding the time frame during which Biosound 
had a supervising neurologist because it was “self-serving” 
and conflicted with testimony from the plea colloquy 
regarding the time frame without any “reasonable 
explanation.”  On December 23, 2016, the government moved 
for summary judgment on the remaining common law claims 
under the same theory—that the defendants had admitted to 
all the elements of the claims.  The District Court agreed and 
granted the motion on April 3, 2017.   
 
On May 3, 2017, Ms. Patel and Heart Solution 
appealed both summary judgment orders.11  They submit two 
primary arguments.  First, they contend that Ms. Patel cannot 
be liable for any unsupervised neurological testing at 
Biosound because she did not own or operate Biosound, and 
thus had no legal duty to ensure Biosound employed a 
neurological testing supervisor.  Second, they argue that even 
if we find them liable for the neurological testing issues at 
Biosound, Mr. Patel’s statement created an issue of material 
                                              
11 Kirtish Patel and Biosound did not appeal.  
8 
 
fact as to the time frame during which the unsupervised 
testing occurred.  We reject both of these arguments.   
 
Moreover, we will affirm the District Court with 
regard to Ms. Patel’s liability on the FCA and common law 
fraud claims.  However, we will vacate the District Court’s 
findings that (1) Heart Solution is estopped from contesting 
liability and damages for all claims, and (2) Ms. Patel is 
estopped from contesting liability and damages for the 
remaining common law claims.   
 
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 31 U.S.C. § 
3732(a) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.  We have jurisdiction 
of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment, 
applying the same standard as the district court.12  Under this 
standard, a court will “grant summary judgment if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”13  
 
III.  
We first address Ms. Patel’s and Heart Solution’s two 
main arguments on why the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment.  First, they contend that Ms. Patel cannot 
be liable for Biosound’s unsupervised testing because she did 
not possess an ownership interest in Biosound and merely 
                                              
12 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d 
Cir. 2014).   
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
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worked as an employee.  We reject this argument and hold 
that ownership interest is irrelevant to FCA liability.  Second, 
they argue that even if Ms. Patel is liable for Biosound’s 
fraud, Mr. Patel’s statement created a triable issue of fact as 
to the years during which Biosound lacked a supervising 
neurologist.  We conclude that Mr. Patel’s statement cannot 
create a disputed issue of fact on summary judgment because 
it was not sworn or made under penalty of perjury.  
 
A.  
We address the issue of ownership first.  Ms. Patel 
argues that because she did not have any ownership interest in 
Biosound, she had no duty to ensure that Biosound employed 
a supervising neurologist and was not in charge of ensuring 
Biosound’s compliance with Medicare regulations.  However, 
whether Ms. Patel had an ownership interest in Biosound is 
irrelevant to her liability under the FCA.14  There are four 
elements to the two FCA claims brought here:  “falsity, 
causation, knowledge, and materiality.”15  Ownership is not 
one of them.  Although corporations and individuals with 
ownership interests—such as board members and 
                                              
14 Ms. Patel also makes this argument in her brief with respect 
to common law fraud, stating that “there is no evidence that 
Nita Patel  made material misrepresentations to Medicare 
regarding supervision of the neurological testing that was 
performed at Biosound,” supposedly because she did not own 
Biosound.  This argument fails on its face because she plainly 
admitted in her plea colloquy that she made such 
misrepresentations.   
15 United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 
481, 487 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).  
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executives—are typically the parties investigated and sued for 
FCA violations, individuals at all levels of a company have 
been found liable under the FCA.16  We conclude that 
individual employees with no ownership interest in a 
company can be liable under Sections 3729(a)(1)(A) and 
3729(a)(1)(B) of the FCA.  
 
This conclusion, that an ownership interest is not 
required for FCA liability, is consistent with the language of 
the FCA.  Section 3729 establishes civil penalties for “[a]ny 
person” in violation of its provisions.17  The FCA does not 
define the term “person,” but the Supreme Court has found 
that the meaning of the word has not changed since 1863, 
when Congress passed the original FCA.18  There is no doubt 
that Congress intended the term “person” to include natural 
                                              
16 See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (wife of psychiatrist who worked as an employee 
in his practice was liable under FCA); United States v. 
Menominee Tribal Enterprises, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1071 
(E.D. Wis. 2009) (employees of a tribe are “persons” under 
the FCA); U.S. ex rel. Burlbaw v. Regents of N.M. State 
Univ., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1215 (D.N.M. 2004) (“[U]nder 
the FCA, state employees are ‘persons’ who may be sued if 
they are sufficiently involved in the submission of a false 
claim to the United States.”).  
17 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).  
18 See Cook County, Ill. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 
119, 125 (2003).  
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persons.  There is no suggestion in the FCA that an ownership 
interest is necessary to the definition of “person.”19  
 
Recent Department of Justice (DOJ) guidance 
regarding the FCA is consistent with our holding that 
ownership is not required for FCA liability.  In 2015, then–
Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates issued a memo 
regarding corporate fraud and wrongdoing, including FCA 
enforcement.20  The memo explicitly states that the DOJ 
should focus on “seeking accountability from the individuals 
who perpetrated the wrongdoing.”21  The memo states that the 
DOJ should “fully leverage its resources to identify culpable 
individuals at all levels in corporate cases”22 and that DOJ 
“lawyers should not agree to a corporate resolution that 
                                              
19 Id. at 125 (“[T]he Court . . . recognized the presumption 
that the statutory term ‘person’ ‘extends as well to persons 
politic and incorporate, as to natural persons whatsoever.’”) 
(quoting United States v. Amedy, 412, 6 L.Ed. 502 (1826)).  
Even if the term’s meaning was not clear, the Dictionary Act 
resolves the question.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2793 (2014) (“The Dictionary Act’s 
definition [of the term person], however, controls only where 
context does not indicate otherwise.”) (citations omitted).  
The Dictionary Act’s definition of the term “person” includes 
“individuals” and does not indicate any necessity for 
ownership interests.  See 1 U.S.C. § 1.  
20 See Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates on Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing to the DOJ, at 4 
(Sept. 9, 2015) (mentioning liability under 31 U.S.C. § 3729 
explicitly).  
21 Id. at 1.   
22 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  
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includes an agreement to dismiss charges against, or provide 
immunity for, individual officers or employees.”23  It is clear 
from the language of the memo that, in the eyes of the DOJ, 
liability does not depend on ownership and employees are 
subject to suit.   
 
Because ownership is irrelevant to FCA liability, the 
first argument fails. 
 
B.  
 Ms. Patel and Heart Solution also argue that there 
remains a triable issue of fact regarding the years during 
which Biosound employed a supervising neurologist.  In 
support of this argument, they rely on Mr. Patel’s statement, 
which claims that Biosound employed a supervising 
neurologist during 2006-2007 and 2012-2014.  We conclude 
that because Mr. Patel’s statement was both unsworn and not 
given under the penalty of perjury, it was insufficient to 
create an issue of fact on summary judgment.   
 
This holding is consistent with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, authority from our sister circuits, and our 
own precedent.  A 2010 amendment to the Advisory 
Committee Notes on Federal Rule 56(c)(4), which governs 
evidence submitted on summary judgment, states “that while 
‘a formal affidavit is no longer required’ on summary 
judgment, a certification submitted as a substitute for an 
affidavit must be subscribed in proper form as true under 
penalty of perjury.”  This amendment incorporates a statutory 
exception to the general rule that affidavits must be sworn to 
                                              
23 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).  
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be considered on summary judgment.  The statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1746, provides that when a matter is required to be 
supported by a sworn affidavit, the matter can instead be 
supported by an unsworn “declaration, certificate, 
verification, or statement,” as long as the statement is made 
under penalty of perjury and dated.  Thus, while an unsworn 
statement may be considered on summary judgment, an 
unsworn statement that has not been made under penalty of 
perjury cannot.   
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same 
conclusion when presented with this issue.  In Nissho-Iwai 
American Corp. v. Kline,24 the only evidence the nonmoving 
party submitted on summary judgment was an statement that 
was “neither sworn nor its contents stated to be true and 
correct nor stated under penalty of perjury.”25  The court held 
that unsworn statements, on their own, generally cannot raise 
an issue of fact as to preclude summary judgment unless the 
statement falls within the statutory exception to this rule 
                                              
24 845 F.2d 1300 (1988). 
25 Id. at 1305-06. 
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under Section 1746.26  The Second and Seventh Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have come to similar conclusions.27 
 
Although we have not directly addressed this issue in a 
precedential opinion, today’s holding is in line with our prior 
rulings.  In Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence,28 we held that a 
district court did not err in refusing to consider an unsworn 
statement on summary judgment because it did not comply 
with Rule 56.29     
 
Accordingly, Mr. Patel’s statement is incompetent 
summary judgment evidence.  His statement is the only 
evidence Ms. Patel and Heart Solution submitted on the issue 
of the whether Biosound had a supervising neurologist at any 
                                              
26 Id. at 1306-07; see also Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 
379, 382 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Although unsworn documents 
usually cannot raise fact issues precluding summary 
judgment, [the] declaration can be considered pursuant to the 
statutory exception found in 28 U.S.C. § 1746.”).   
27 See In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 722 F.3d 
483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013) (unsworn statements can be 
considered on summary judgment as long as they comply 
with 28 U.S.C. § 1746); Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 859 
(7th Cir. 1985) (“Affidavits are admissible in summary 
judgment proceedings if they are made under penalties of 
perjury; only unsworn documents purporting to be affidavits 
may be rejected”). 
28 396 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2005). 
29 Id. at 322-23.  Woloszyn was decided before the 2010 
amendments to the Advisory Notes, and thus, did not consider 
whether the statement complied with the 28 U.S.C. § 1746 
exception.  
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point between 2006 and 2014.30  Therefore, there is no 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Biosound had a 
supervising neurologist. 
 
IV.  
We now turn to collateral estoppel as applied to Heart 
Solution and conclude that Heart Solution is not collaterally 
estopped from contesting liability or damages for the claims 
against it.  Under federal common law, collateral estoppel 
applies when “(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same 
as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue was actually 
litigated; (3) it was determined by a final and valid judgment; 
and (4) the determination was essential to the prior 
judgment.”31  Moreover, “collateral estoppel cannot apply 
when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted 
did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in 
the earlier case.”32  In situations involving the collateral 
                                              
30 Ms. Patel and Heart Solution also argue that the words 
“supervision” and “the” in the sentencing judge’s questioning 
are ambiguous and create an issue of material fact as to the 
time frame during which Biosound employed a supervising 
neurologist.  This argument fails.  Even if these words were 
ambiguous in the context of the plea colloquy, the Appellants 
have put forth no evidence supporting Ms. Patel’s 
understanding of such terms.  Thus, these arguments are 
insufficient to create an issue of fact at the summary 
judgment stage.  
31 In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(citations omitted).  
32 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (citations 
omitted).  
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estoppel effects of a prior criminal judgment, “the court must 
examine the record of the criminal proceeding,” including the 
plea colloquy, “to determine specifically what issues were 
decided.”33  “[R]easonable doubt as to which issues were 
decided by a prior judgment should be resolved against using 
such judgment as an estoppel.”34 
 
Heart Solution cannot be estopped based on Ms. 
Patel’s criminal conviction and plea colloquy.  The United 
States charged and convicted only Mr. and Ms. Patel of 
healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347—not Heart 
Solution.35  As such, Heart Solution did not have any 
opportunity, much less a “full and fair opportunity,”36 to 
litigate any issue involved in this appeal.  Moreover, whether 
Heart Solution defrauded Medicare by submitting false 
reports about neurological testing was not actually litigated or 
determined by a final judgment in the criminal proceeding.   
Ms. Patel’s plea testimony and conviction certainly speak to 
her role in Biosound’s schemes to defraud Medicare, but they 
do not establish that Heart Solution had any role in this 
scheme.   
 
Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s holding that 
Heart Solution is estopped.  
 
                                              
33 Chisholm v. Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 48 (3d Cir. 
1981).  
34 Id. at 50 (citing Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 
(3d Cir. 1970)).  
35 See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Patel, No. 15-cr-
592 (D.N.J. June 9, 2014), ECF No. 1.  
36 Allen, 449 U.S. at 95.  
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V.  
 Next, we address Ms. Patel’s liability for FCA 
violations and common law fraud and conclude that (1) the 
District Court properly found that she was estopped from 
contesting the falsity and knowledge elements of these 
claims; and (2) the Government met its burden to show 
materiality and causation.   
 
  An FCA violation has four elements:  “falsity, 
causation, knowledge, and materiality.”37  Ms. Patel admitted 
that:  (1) she “falsely represented to Medicare that the 
neurological testing being performed at Biosound Medical 
Services was being supervised by a licensed neurologist 
when, in fact, it was not;” and (2) she “knowingly made these 
false representations to Medicare.”  As a result, she is 
collaterally estopped from denying the falsity and knowledge 
elements of the FCA claims.  
 
We also conclude that the materiality element has been 
satisfied38 even though the District Court did not apply 
Supreme Court precedent.  In June 2016, the Supreme Court 
decided Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex 
                                              
37 United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 
481, 487 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).    
38 Because we find that the materiality element of the FCA 
claims has been satisfied, we need not reach the question of 
whether Ms. Patel is collaterally estopped from contesting 
materiality.  Therefore, we make no determinations as to 
whether materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1347—the criminal 
statute under which Ms. Patel was convicted—and materiality 
under the FCA are the same “essential element.”   
18 
 
rel. Escobar,39 where it held that materiality is an element of 
all FCA claims, regardless of whether the specific statutory 
provision lists materiality as an element.40  The Court then 
provided guidance on how the materiality requirement should 
be applied.  It explained that a misrepresentation is not 
material merely because the government designates 
compliance with a particular regulatory requirement as a 
condition of payment or because “the Government would 
have the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s 
noncompliance [with the regulation].”41   In fact, it is “very 
strong evidence” that a requirement is not material “if the 
Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual 
knowledge that certain requirements were violated.”42  Thus, 
materiality “cannot be found where noncompliance is minor 
or insubstantial.”43  On the other hand, materiality may be 
found where “the Government consistently refuses to pay 
claims in the mine run of cases based on noncompliance with 
the particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
requirement.”44    
   
The District Court did not apply Escobar in its 
analysis.  It relied exclusively on the provision labeling 
                                              
39 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).   
40 Id. at 2002-03; see also United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS 
Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 763 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Despite 
the lack of a materiality requirement, the Supreme Court had 
no trouble finding that the FCA’s materiality requirement also 
applied to this section.”).  
41 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003.  
42 Id.   
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
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supervision of diagnostic testing a condition of payment 
rather than looking to the record for other factors, as provided 
in Escobar, bearing on the materiality analysis.45  However, 
when we examine the record, we conclude that there is no 
issue of fact as to materiality under Escobar.  
 
The initial burden was on the government to show 
materiality, and it met its burden when it submitted that, 
pursuant to the regulation, Medicare would not pay the claims 
in the absence of a certification from a supervising 
neurologist.  Neither Ms. Patel nor any other defendant put 
forth any evidence indicating otherwise.  She made no 
showing that noncompliance with the supervision 
requirement was “minor or insubstantial”46 or that Medicare 
generally pays this type of claim “in full despite its actual 
knowledge that certain requirements were violated.”47   
Because the Government met its burden to show materiality 
and Ms. Patel put forth no evidence in rebuttal, the element of 
materiality was properly established, and there is no need to 
remand this case to the District Court to determine materiality 
under Escobar.   
 
 This conclusion as to materiality also means that there 
was causation—the final FCA element.  Because these 
misrepresentations were material, they caused damage to 
                                              
45 Escobar specifically states that whether a “provision is 
labeled a condition of payment is relevant to but not 
dispositive of the materiality inquiry.”  Id. at 2001 (emphasis 
added). 
46 Id. at 2003.  
47 Id.   
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Medicare.  In other words, but for the misrepresentations, 
Medicare would never have paid the claims. 
 
Next, we address the District Court’s holding that Ms. 
Patel’s conviction also estops her from contesting liability as 
to common law fraud.  The elements of fraud under New 
Jersey law are (1) knowingly making a material 
misrepresentation; (2) an intention that the other person rely 
on the misrepresentation; (3) reasonable reliance by the other 
person; and (4) resulting damages.48  We agree with the 
District Court that Ms. Patel is estopped from denying that 
she knowingly made misrepresentations to Medicare 
regarding the neurological testing being performed at 
Biosound.  Moreover, for the same reasons as in the FCA 
claim, we find that the materiality and causation/reliance 
elements of common law fraud have been met.  Therefore, we 
will affirm the District Court’s determination as to common 
law fraud.  
 
VI.  
Turning to the remaining common law claims—unjust 
enrichment, disgorgement of profits, and payment by mistake 
of fact—we hold that Ms. Patel is not collaterally estopped 
from denying liability or damages as to these claims.   
 
An essential element of all three of these claims is that 
the defendant retained funds—payments from Medicare in 
this case.  Unjust enrichment requires a showing “that 
defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit 
                                              
48 Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 172-73 
(2005). 
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without payment would be unjust.”49   A disgorgement of 
profits claim requires that the defendant have profit or 
revenue to disgorge.50  And payment by mistake of fact 
allows the United States to recover money from a defendant 
that “its agents have wrongfully, erroneously, or illegally 
paid.”51     
 
Whether Ms. Patel or Heart Solution specifically—as 
opposed to Mr. Patel and Biosound—retained any from funds 
from Medicare was not determined in the criminal case so as 
to estop Ms. Patel from contesting liability for these claims.  
In order to find that Ms. Patel is collaterally estopped, we 
must find that the issue of whether she retained funds was (1) 
involved and litigated in the prior action, (2) actually 
determined by a final judgment, and (3) essential to the 
conviction.52  Ms. Patel’s conviction and plea colloquy do not 
permit such findings.  First, 18 U.S.C. § 1347 criminalizes 
knowingly “defraud[ing] any health care benefit program” or 
“obtain[ing] . . . money . . . owned by . . . any health care 
benefit program.”  Thus, Ms. Patel need not have obtained 
money from Medicare to be liable under Section 1347; she 
could have just defrauded Medicare.   
 
Her plea colloquy does not establish that she obtained 
funds from Medicare.  Ms. Patel admitted that she submitted 
false claims to Medicare about the neurological testing at her 
                                              
49 VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994) 
(emphasis added). 
50 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals 
Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1993). 
51 United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 415 (1938). 
52 See In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir. 1992).  
22 
 
husband’s company, Biosound.  She also admitted that 
Biosound and Heart Solution were paid approximately $1.18 
million from Medicare for unsupervised neurological testing.  
These admissions may suggest that Ms. Patel and/or Heart 
Solution retained at least part of the $1.18 million, but they 
are not sufficient to estop Ms. Patel from arguing and 
submitting evidence to show otherwise.  It is possible that Mr. 
Patel and Biosound retained the entire benefit and Ms. Patel 
and Heart Solution retained nothing.  The criminal 
proceedings do not speak to this question, much less resolve 
it.  Where there is “reasonable doubt as to which issues were 
decided by a prior judgment” we cannot conclude that 
collateral estoppel applies.53   
 
This same reasoning applies to the question of 
damages.  Ms. Patel is not estopped from contesting damages 
because neither her conviction nor colloquy conclusively 
establish she was ever paid by Medicare for unsupervised 
neurological testing. 
 
As such, we will reverse the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on the unjust enrichment, disgorgement 
of profits, and payment by mistake of fact claims.  We will 
also reverse the District Court’s finding as to damages 
assessed against Ms. Patel.    
 
VII.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment on the issue of Ms. Patel’s liability under 
                                              
53 Chisholm v. Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir. 
1981).   
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the FCA for false claims submitted to Medicare for 
unsupervised neurological tests and on the issue of Ms. 
Patel’s common law fraud.  We will reverse the remaining 
portions of the District Court’s summary judgment orders and 
remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
